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THE VALIDITY OF A STATE TAX UPON THE
COMING INTO POSSESSION AND ENJOYMENT OF A VESTED REMAINDER
The United States Supreme Court has recently decided in
Coolidge v. Long' that a state may nQt impose an inheritance
tax upon the coming into possession and enjoyment, through
the death of the life tenant, of a remainder previously vested.
The decision, while actually passing only upon the-Massachusetts
inheritance tax, has a very wide effect since the vast majority
of the states purport to impose exactly this sort of tax, 2 and
all these laws must now be regarded as invalidated.
The case passed upon by the Supreme Court arose as follows:
A husband and wife created a trust estate, the income to be paid
to themselves and to the survivor of them for life, and on the
death of the survivor the principal was to be divided among
their five sons equally, the share of any previously deceased
son to go to his estate. At the time of the creation of the trust
estate there was no law of Massachusetts, the domicile of all the
parties, imposing a tax upon the succession of such an estate.
Subsequently, however, and long before the death of either of
the parents, such a statute was passed. 3 Later the par'ents
assigned all their interest in the trust estate to the sons, but
the state court decided that this did not give the sons any right
to put an end to the trust.4 Upon the death of the husband
151 Sup. Ct. 306 (Feb. 24, 1931).
Over 40 states and territories have statutes purporting to impose such
a tax. For the Indiana statute to this effect, see Burns' 1929 Supp., Sec.
14389.
3 The trust was created in 1907, whereas the first statute purporting to
tax such a transfer in pursuance of a gift made before its enactment was
passed in 1912. The wife died in 1921 and the husband in 1925.
4 Coolidge v. Loring, 235 Mass. 220, 126 N. E. 276 (1920).
2
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(who survived the wife) the five sons received the corpus of the
trust estate, and the state exacted from them an inheritance tax
in accordance with the statute. Claiming that the tax law was
unconstitutional, the sons brought suit to recover the tax so
paid. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustained
the validity of the tax and so denied recovery. 5 As already said,
the Federal Supreme Court reversed this decision. The latter
court declared the tax contrary to the United States Constitution
on two grounds: (1) That it was an impairment of the obligation of the contract represented by the trust agreement, and
(2) that it deprived the plaintiffs of property without due
process of law. The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Butler. However, it was only a 5-4 decision, Justices Roberts,
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting. Mr. Justice Roberts
wrote an elaborate dissenting opinion.
It seems clear that the contention of the majority that such
a tax violates the contracts clause of the Federal Constitution is
not to be taken seriously. A state tax is never regarded as an
impairment of the obligation of a contract unless the contract
itself contains or implies a clear promise to absolve one party
from taxation-and therefore unless the state itself, or one
of its subdivisions is a party to the contract. 6 This was clearly
'not the case here. Even when the state is a party to the alleged
contract an exemption from taxation is not readily inferred,
and will not be considered to exist without express language or
at least a more than usually clear implication.7 . We are therefore thrown back upon the usual recourse in such matters, the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, like
charity, covers a multitude of sins-including, it is to be feared,
certain intellectual misdeeds of our highest judicial tribunal.
In considering this matter, we may pass for the time being
the question of the desirability of this result, and begin with the
authorities. And it must be said that there are several states,
led by New York,8 that are committed to the position taken by
5 Coolidge v. Commissioner, 167 N. E. 757 (1929).
6 Kehrer vi. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 (1905) ; Lake Superior Mines v. Lord,
271 U. S. 577 (1926).
7 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514 (1830) ; No. Missouri
Railroad Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 46 (1873); People v. New York,
199 U. S. 1 (1905).
In very rare instances, however, a contract with the
state may be held to necessarily imply an exemption from taxation, even
though not expressed. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (1877); Stearns
v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223 (1900).
8 Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789 (1902).
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the court in this case-that an inheritance tax upon the coming
into possession of a vested remainder by reason of the death
of the life tenant is unconstitutional, as taking of property-without due process of law. But such state authorities, even if they
were in the majority, which does not seem to be the case, are
not binding on the Federal courts. It seems in fact that such
Federal cases as are analogous to the one under discussion favor
a result contrary to that here reached by the court.
The majority contends that the tax is retroactive because the
trust was created before the tax on the succession to the remandermen was imposed. It is true that an excise tax otherwise valid may be overthrown if so seriously retroactive as to
be regarded as unfair. 9 But the Supreme Court has sustained
a number of excise taxes which were avowedly retroactivelo
The test is really one of fairness." It is submitted that the tax
in issue in the principal case was really not retroactive, as it
applied only to the coming into actual possession and enjoyment of the trust property by the remaindermen, which occurred
long after the passage of the law imposing the tax. But admitting that it is retroactive, it seems nevertheless fair, and so
should have been sustained, at least on this point.
It is also entirely clear that the Supreme Court has itself
construed various Federal and state tax laws as applying only
upon the actual coming into possession of the property, and by
permitting the enforcement of such laws has inferentially sustained them. It is of course true that a distinction may be and
frequently is made for tax purposes between vested and contingent remainders. 12 Generally, too, there is the same tendency
GBlodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (1927); Untermeyer v. Anderson,

276 U. S. 440 (1928). For similar reasons, a tax law will be construed, if
possible, as only prospective in effect. Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529
(1922); Levy v. Wardwell, 258 U. S. 542 (1922).

See also Lewellyn v.

Frick, 268 U. S. 238 (1925).
10 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916); Billings v.
United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914); Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S.
409 (1930).
"1 This is brought out very clearly in Milliken v. United States, 51 Sup.

Ct. 324, a decision promulgated only one week later than that of the principal case. This case upheld a federal estate tax imposed so as to include

a gift made in contemplation of death before its passage, but when a previous tax law imposing lower rates was in effect. The court stated that it
would be quite unfair to impose a new and unheard-of form of taxation
upon the estate of the decedent, but that it was not unfair to regard him
as having anticipated the chance of increased rates for an existing tax.
12 Salarn u. New York, 278 U. S. 484 (1929).
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in tax cases as in all others to construe doubtful limitations as
vested rather than contingent,' 3 though there seem to be some
exceptions to this rule where the court believes that the legis14
lature has used these words in other than their usual sense.
And there is no dispute that the vesting of a clearly contingent
remainder is taxable. 15 But the distinction between a vested
and a contingent remainder is a matter of great technicality and
one which has very little relation to the actual control of or
benefit from the property, or the value of the interests under
consideration. 16 It is therefore hardly surprizing that there
has been a considerable tendency in drawing tax statutes to
ignore the technical distinction between vesting and contingency
and emphasize rather the more practical considerations. Thus
the Federal inheritance taxes at both the time of the Civil war
and the Spanish war taxed the coming into possession rather
than the vesting of remainders. 17 State statutes have been drawn
on a similar basis and have been so construed by the Supreme
Court.' 8 While these cases deal with the construction rather
than the constitutionality of these statutes, yet they are quite
inconsistent with the apparent idea of the majority of the court
in the principal case that the taxation of the coming into possession of a remainder already vested is such an extraordinary
and unprecedented procedure as to cast suspicion upon the basic
validity of the law.
More nearly in point are the cases involving situations where
the power of revocation or of change of beneficiary is retained
by the creator of the trust. It is clear that this does not invalidate the trust or make it less binding.'9 Yet it is held that
1' McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340 (1885); United States v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 222 U. S. 158 (1911).

14 It has been held that a federal statute providing for the refund of
taxes on interests "vested" before a certain date did not apply to residuary
legacies unless the estate was fully settled by that date, on the ground that
the amount of such legacies was not yet determined. United States v.
Jones, 236 U. S. 106 (1915); McCoach v. Pratt, 236 U. S. 562 (1915). See
also, Henry v. United States, 251 U. S. 393 (1920). There is no doubt that

the mere uncertainty of amount does not ordinarily prevent the vesting of
an interest in an estate; but the court construed the Congressional intent
as requiring a different interpretation of this statutory language.
15 Wright v. Blakeslee, 101 U. S. 174 (1879).
16 See Burdick on Real Property, pp. 356-361.
17 Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589 (1876); Mason v. Sargent, 104 U. S.
689 (1881) ; Vanderbilt v. Eidun,
196 U. S. 480 (1905).
18 Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525 (1912).

19 Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225 (1879).
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the retention of such a power by the settlor makes the property
a part of his estate in such sense that an inheritance tax can
validly be imposed at his death. 20 Indeed this feature of the
Massachusetts law itself was recently sustained by the Supreme
Court, which explicitly conceded that the interest of the bene' 21
ficiary was technically "vested.
Still more pertinent in this connection is the recent decision
that the property held by a husband and wife in tenancy by the
entireties may, on the death of the husband be subjected to inheritance tax. 22 It was here unsuccessfully argued in behalf
of the wife that she already had full ownership in the property
and therefore received nothing through her husband's death.
The court conceded that this argument was technically sound,
but sustained the tax on the ground that the wife received an
important practical benefit in the cutting off of her husband's
equal right in, and to control, the property. This coming into
exclusive possession and enjoyment was held to be taxable as a
transfer by death. The same decision has been made with respect to California community property. 23 These cases are indubitable authorities in favor of sustaining an inheritance tax
upon the actual coming into the enjoyment of property as the
result of the death of another, even though the person thus benefited was already the owner of an interest in the property regarded by the law as vested.
Even more leeway has been given to the states. Thus a state
inheritance tax may be imposed upon the estate of a person
who has died before its enactment, provided the estate is not
completely settled before the tax is imposed. 24 In these cases
it makes no difference that the remainders are already vested
at the time the tax is imposed, or even that no remainder is
provided for.25
20 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929) ; Reinecke
v. Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929). See also May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238
(1930).
21 Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260 (1928).
22 Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930).
23 Mojt v. Kelly, 218 U. S. 400 (1910).
24 Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. (U. S.) 456 (1854).
(While this
case was decided before the adoption of the 14th Amendment, it was held in
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (1902) to have been correctly decided even
under the restrictions of that amendment); Nickel v. Cole. 256 U. S. 222
(1921).
25 Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543 (1906).
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But the clearest of all the authorities for permitting a state
to lay a tax under the circumstances of the principal case are
the cases relating to general powers of appointment. It has
been held that a state may impose an inheritance tax upon the
exercise of a general power of appointment to take effect on
the death of the donee of the power, notwithstanding the fact
that no inheritance tax was imposed at the time of the creation
of the power.26 It is impossible to have a more direct defiance
of the technical rules of property law, since it is settled that the
27
beneficiary takes from the donor not the donee of the power.
From a strictly legal standpoint, therefore, there is nothing to
tax, and the court admits as much. The tax is sustained in
view of the practical fact that the death of the donee of the
power is the "generating fact" which puts the beneficiary into
possession and enjoyment of the estate.
It seems clear, therefore, that the previous decisions of the
Supreme Court would have led to a fairly confident prediction
that the Massachusetts tax involved in the principal case, as
well as the similar taxes imposed by nearly all the states, would
have been sustained. Two cases were, however, relied on to
prove the contrary. These are Shukert v. Allen, 28 and Nichols
v. Coolidge,29 the latter being of especial importance because involving the same trust estate as that under consideration in the
principal case. In the Shukert case it was held that where a
testator created a trust, the income to accumulate for thirty
years and then the principal and accumulated income to be divided among his children, the estate was not subject to Federal
taxation at his death during the thirty-year period, because the
trust took effect at once and there was nothing left in his estate
to tax. In the Nichols case, similarly, it was held that no Federal estate tax could be imposed on the death of one of the two
creators of the trust.
It might seem, then, that these two cases are authorities
against the validity of the imposition of a tax upon a vested
estate merely because it has through the death of another person come into possession and enjoyment of the beneficiaries.
But a distinction must be noted between two kinds of inheritance
taxes. There may be a tax upon the passing of the decedent's
26

Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466 (1907) ; Orr v. Gilumn, supra, note

27

Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed.), p. 1048.

24.
28 273
29 274

U. S. 545 (1927).
U. S. 531 (1927).
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estate (a transfer tax) or it may be levied upon the receipt of
property from the estate by the beneficiary (a succession tax).
The Federal Government has levied both sorts of taxes, 30 but
the one now in effect is clearly a transfer tax and is measured
by the amount of the estate of the decedent. 31 A state may
32
also levy inheritance taxes on either or both of these theories,
but the majority of the states levy succession taxes-and such
is the case with Massachusetts. No doubt the court was right
when it decided in the Nichols case that the trust property was
no longer owned by the creators of the trust so as to be subject
to the Federal estate tax; but it by no means follows that there
was nothing passing to the beneficiaries upon the death of the
surviving parent. 33 If there was, Massachusetts purported to
tax such succession, and was entitled to do so.
It is apparent therefore that an opposite decision of the
principal case, permitting the states to impose an excise tax upon
the coming into possession and enjoyment of even vested interests, would have been much more consistent with the previous
decisions of the Supreme Court itself. It is submitted also
that this would have been a more desirable result. However
strong was the technical legal position of the beneficiaries of
this trust before the death of both of their parents, the actual
effect of such deaths was to change their financial status with
respect to the trust property from a mere hopeful anticipation
to an actual realization and enjoyment. Indeed, they themselves realized their as yet lack of tangible advantage by attempting to put an end to the trust-an attempt which was
unsuccessful in spite of the cooperation therein of the parents
themselves. 34 To say that the event which gave these sons the
actual possession and enjoyment of the property which they
had been unable to obtain previously even by court proceedings,
is not within the control or taxing power of the state, seems a bit
ludicrous-and yet this is the only way in which the Supreme
Court can reach its result. Taxation is, or should be, a practical
rather than a technical legal matter; and as has been seen, the
Supreme Court has tended to take this position, especially with
30

Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 77 (1900).

31 Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61 (1924).

32 Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137 (1925).
33 See Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra, note 21.
34 Coolidge v. Loring, supra, note 4.
In this case the parents were the

formal plaintiffs; but they of course acted in the interest of their sons.
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regard to inheritance taxes.83 The present decision seems to be
an unfortunate departure from the previous positions of the
court-a position buttressed not only by preponderant authority,

but also by sound reasoning and practical desirability.
ROBERT C. BROWN.

Indiana University Law School.
35 See cases cited supra, notes 20 to 26. See also, United States v.
Perkins, 163 U. S. 625 (1896), and Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 (1900),
which are decisions to the same effect, but involve intergovernmental relations. But cf. Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47 (1929)

